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POLICY CHALLENGE
High fines for cartel activity could entail costs for society and might be
difficult to implement. Nevertheless, there is no case for reducing current
levels of EU anti-cartel fines. Fine levels already take the economic crisis
into account, and the net present value of fines might prove to be too low to
discourage collusion. We estimate that fines might even be not high enough
to offset the additional profits yielded by collusion. Fines should be
complemented with other measures to increase deterrence, in particular
personal sanctions
targeting company
officers who are
responsible for leading
the company to commit
infringements. In the
short term, pressure on
decision makers could
be increased by reducing
the expected duration of
investigations. 
Cartels sanctioned by the European Commission, 2001-12
THE ISSUE Anti-cartel enforcement is the least controversial of competition
policy themes. Agreements to restrict competition, such as price fixing or
market sharing, have obvious negative effects on welfare. Within the
European Union, however, industry representatives have increasingly
voiced concern that the European Commission applies a too-strict fining
policy to enforce anti-cartel law, particularly since the introduction of new
guidelines on fines in 2006. Fines are said to be too high, disproportionate
and liable to introduce distortions into the market, ultimately leading to
higher prices for consumers. It is often argued that more lenient
approaches should be followed in crisis times.
Source: Bruegel.
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1. See, for example,
Nikki Tait and Michael
Peel, ‘Cartels put fines
in the dock’, Financial
Times, 14 July 2009:
‘Michael Cutting, a
London-based partner
at Linklaters, says that
– independently of the
downturn – many
competition lawyers
increasingly think the
cartel fines being levied
in Brussels are
becoming
“extraordinarily large”’.
2. Affected sales means
all sales in a cartelised
market. They include
sales by all market
players (that is, not
necessarily cartel
members). Projection
calculated on the basis
of decisions for which
information on affected
markets is reported.
Sales are indexed to
inflation and cumulated
throughout the period
cartels were active. See
Box 1.
3. http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-12-83_
en.htm.
4. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriSer
v/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
C:2006:210:0002:0005
:EN:PDF.
SINCE JANUARY 2001, the Euro-
pean Commission has imposed
fines totalling €18.4 billion on
companies that have engaged in
cartel activity with effects on the
European Economic Area (EEA).
Industry is increasingly voicing
concerns that the level of fines
has become too high1, but relative
to the potential harm that cartels
could cause the European econ-
omy, €18.4 billion appears
extraordinarily low. Fines account
for a tiny proportion of the
turnover of affected markets.
Simple estimates suggest that
the total affected EEA sales for the
periods during which the sanc-
tioned cartels were active could
amount to roughly €209 billion2. 
In the words of the European
Union’s competition commis-
sioner Joaquin Almunia, the
‘hidden tax’ imposed on the econ-
omy by cartelists places a
limitation on economic growth3,
with the ultimate burden falling on
companies further down the
value chain and on European con-
sumers. There is no doubt that
cartels should therefore be tack-
led forcefully, which is why cartel
investigations are given the high-
est priority in the European
competition authority’s agenda. 
Competition authorities have two
ways to fight collusion. They can
act to prevent cartels by acting on
market factors that facilitate col-
lusion, such as concentration or
barriers to entry. Or they can
render explicit price-fixing agree-
ment too costly by threatening
the imposition of monetary sanc-
tions. The size of fines is the stick
that the European Commission
has used most in the last decade,
particularly since the introduction
in 2006 of new guidelines on the
imposition of fines4. The guide-
lines were introduced to increase
the level of predictability of the
Commission’s fining policy, and to
ensure closer adherence to eco-
nomic theory: under the previous
guidelines, the Commission could
exercise a considerable degree of
discretion in assessing the signif-
icance of an infringement. While
not fully eliminating discretion,
the 2006 guidelines make a direct
link between sales affected by
the cartel and the size of the fine,
and provide for more systematic
treatment of mitigating and aggra-
vating factors (see  the next
section for further details).
The objective is to ensure the
maximum level of deterrence
while introducing the least possi-
ble market distortion.
Disproportionately high fines,
beyond what is strictly necessary
for deterring illegal action, could
be ineffective because they
would be deemed not credible or,
worse, would discourage pro-
competitive behaviour and would
ultimately be not compatible with
the principle of proportionality of
sanctions (Wils, 2006).
In this policy brief, we describe
the underlying economics of fines
and analyse the anti-cartel meas-
ures taken by the Commission
since January 2001. We estimate
the value drained by cartels from
the European economy, assess
the impact of the economic crisis
on cartel decisions and test the
claim that fines are too high. We
also suggest ways of increasing
deterrence without necessarily
making fines larger.
DETERRENCE AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION’S FINING POLICY
The ‘optimal fine’, defined as the
minimum payment that would
ensure complete deterrence,
should be enough to offset the
expected additional profit accru-
ing to cartel members as a result
of their illegal action, if they are
caught by anti-trust authorities.
Key parameters for calculating
the optimal fine are therefore the
price increase (cartel overcharge)
and the probability of detection.
The empirical evidence on cartel
overcharges (for a survey, see for
instance Combe and Monnier,
2009) reveals a significant diver-
sity of price increases. It is often
considered that a 20 percent (for
national cartels) to 30 percent
(for international cartels) over-
charge is a conservative estimate
of average overcharges actually
implemented.
No reliable estimate is found in
the literature of the probability of
detection by antitrust authorities.
By definition, a reliable estimate
of this probability would require
information on cartels that have
not been uncovered. What can be
estimated however is the proba-
bility that a cartel will be detected
during the course of a year, condi-
tional on the cartel being
eventually detected. Most
researchers would agree that a 15
percent chance of detection is an
approximate upper bound
(Combe and Monnier, 2009).
Since not all cartels are detected,
economic theory suggests that
the fine should be inversely corre-
lated to the probability of
detection (Bebchuk and Kaplow,
1992). A 15 percent detection
rate would suggest fines 6.7
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5.  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriSer
v/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
C:2006:298:0017:0022
:EN:PDF.
times higher than the expected
gains yielded by the cartel.
The current fining guidelines
The current guidelines on the
method of setting fines set out
two steps: first, the basic amount
of the fine is established. This
amount is related to a proportion
of the value of affected sales,
depending of the seriousness and
duration of the infringement. In
practice, the basic amount is set
by determining an initial variable
amount of the fine as a percent-
age of up to 30 percent of the
firm's sales within the EEA market
in the last business year of the
cartel. This figure is then multi-
plied by the number of years the
infringement has lasted. Finally, a
fixed component equal to 15-25
percent of annual EEA sales is
added as a further deterrent.
Second, the basic amount is
modified taking into account
aggravating or mitigating factors.
Aggravating factors include
evidence that the company is
recidivist, or has played a leading
role in the cartel. Mitigating
factors could include the limited
participation of a company in
the infringement. Additional
reductions up to 100 percent of
the fine may be granted to
whistleblowers in the framework
of the Commission notice on
immunity from fines and
reduction of fines in cartel cases5,
or if the fine would hamper the
economic viability of the cartelist.
A reduction of 10 percent can be
granted if the company admits its
guilt. Fines can never exceed 10
percent of a company’s global
turnover, in any case.
TRENDS
The average number of cartel
decisions each year is six, affect-
ing on average 40 companies
(see the figure on the front page,
which  reports the evolution of
European Commission cartel
decisions and the number of com-
panies sanctioned since 2001).
While the number of cartels sanc-
tioned has shown a slight
downward trend since 2001,
there has been a slight increase in
the number of affected compa-
nies, suggesting that the
Commission has tended to focus
on fewer but bigger cartels.
The average duration of exposed
cartels (between approximately
four and 14 years) did not
increase after the adoption of the
2006 guidelines. In fact, the
cartels most recently uncovered
by the Commission were of
relatively short duration (on
average approximately four years
for cartels uncovered during 2011
and 2012).
Figure 1 describes trends in the
Commission's fining policy. Total
and average fines since the intro-
duction of the new fining policy in
2006 appear systematically
higher. This seems to support the
claim that the Commission’s
fining policy has become tougher,
which may help explain the out-
burst of discontent from industry
representatives. The perception
that the nominal price paid by
cartelists is higher than it was in
the past is confirmed by the data.
This analysis however does not
yet take into account the signifi-
cance of the respective cartels. An
increase in the efficiency of anti-
cartel enforcement by antitrust
authorities should be associated
with the discovery of more struc-
tured and stable cartels
(Harrington and Chang, 2009).
Figure 2 on the next page
explores that intuition further. It
concerns only cartels for which
EEA sales information was pub-
licly disclosed in the decision (70
percent of the sample, see Box 1).
The  columns report estimates of
the cumulated value of total EEA
sales affected by cartels during
the whole cartelised period. The
red line shows the total aggregate
fines for those cartels. The figure
clearly suggests that after the
introduction of the 2006 guide-
lines, there was an actual change
in the Commission's fining policy
consistent with the aim of the new
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Source: Bruegel.
Figure 1: Fines levied on cartels by the European Commission, 2001-12
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guidelines: a link between
cartelists’ potential profits and
the fine was successfully estab-
lished. This was particularly
evident in 2007 and 2008, when
the value of affected markets was
especially high6. Rather than
describing the Commission’s
fining policy as ‘tougher’ in recent
years, one should therefore more
properly point out that more
recent fines reflect the breadth of
the scope and the pervasiveness
of the effect on the economy of
cartels since 2007. These factors
were not properly captured by the
Commission’s fining policy prior
to 2006.
Figure 3 reports estimates of the
total value drained by cartelised
sectors, assuming a 15 percent
and a 30 percent overcharge and
inelastic demand (for cases for
which EEA sales information is
available – see Box 1)7. The figure
shows the value cartels drain for
6. The high variability of
cumulated EEA sales
from year to year (eg
between 2008 and
2009) can be explained
by the fact that the
average number of
sanctioned cartels per
year is low in absolute
terms. Therefore, even
if just one small cartel
is discovered, that can
reduce significantly the
average size of cartels
sanctioned in that year.
7. For value drained by
cartelised sector we
mean value lost by
customers because it
shifted to sellers in the
form of higher profits, or
was wasted because
some goods are no
longer purchased
following the price
increase. Assuming
inelastic demand
simply means that all
the value is lost in the
form of higher profits to
sellers and the ‘dead-
weight loss’ is zero. This
is equivalent to
minimising the amount
of value lost by
customers.
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Source: Bruegel. Note: only cartels for which EEA market information is provided.
Figure 2: Sales affected by cartels, 2001-12, € millions
BOX 1: SAMPLING AND MAIN METHODOLOGY INSIGHTS
Sampling
Our analysis is based on final decisions on cartels adopted by the European Commission between 2001 and 2012.
The data does not account for ex-post judicial adjustment. Re-adoption decisions were excluded from the sample,
resulting in a sample of 73 cartels and 479 companies.
Treatment of EEA sales
Seventy percent of the decisions in the sample report information on the EEA sales affected by the cartel. For about
13 percent of the sanctioned companies, we have the detail of sales at company level. When partial information is
reported, we use estimates counter checked by reverse-engineering sales from the final fine. For two undertakings
this counter-check fails significantly. Therefore we exclude those undertakings from the analysis.
Value drain and estimation of extra profits
The amount of value drained by cartels is calculated by cumulating all EEA sales affected for all the years in which
the cartel was active, indexed to EU inflation. Value drained is computed according to the following formula:
D = Δ/(1+Δ) EEA
Where Δ is the cartel overcharge and EEA is the cumulated EEA sales as defined above. The price overcharge is rarely
reported in the decisions and, if reported, is unlikely to be fully reliable, due to objective estimation difficulties. For that
reason and for consistency in the treatment of the data, in this paper we assume 15 percent and 30 percent as aver-
age estimates of the price overcharge. These assumptions are considered the most conservatives in the literature.
Extra Profits are calculated assuming constant marginal costs and according to the following formula: 
“Extra profit" = ((1–ϵ)(Δ+m) – m)/(1+Δ)(1–ϵ) EEAi
Where ϵ is the decrease in demand triggered by the price increase, such that ϵ=│ε│ x Δ with ε being the demand
elasticity,  m is the pre-cartel profit margin, EEAi is the cumulated EEA sales for undertaking i. Consistent with Combe
and Monnier (2009), we consider that assuming ε=-2 and m=0.15 is a conservative basis for the estimation of extra
profits: most cartels affect intermediate goods for which demand is normally inelastic.
Investigation duration
Investigation duration is computed by taking as starting date the first date on which any activity by the Commission
related to the case is reported in the public domain. That can be the moment of the submission of a leniency appli-
cation, a surprise inspection, or any other event reported in the decision or Commission press release.
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8. Assuming that
cartels with and without
EEA sales information
in the decisions are not
too dissimilar in
statistical terms.
9. See, for example,
Competition Commis-
sioner, Joaquin
Almunia: “some voices
coming from the busi-
ness community claim
that our fines are too
high, especially in
these difficult times. I
disagree. [...] [I] am
aware that not all com-
panies involved in
cartels are awash with
money [...], and if they
are genuinely unable to
pay without going
bankrupt we take this
into account”. See
http://europa.eu/rapid/p
ress-release_SPEECH-
11-268_en.htm.
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THE EFFECT OF THE CRISIS
Fines since the implementation of
the 2006 guidelines could have
been higher were it not for the
economic crisis. Times of crisis
often give industry representa-
tives an opportunity to call for a
more lenient approach to fines.
Companies that enjoyed extra
profits because of their collusion
could be on the edge of bank-
ruptcy during difficult economic
times, and even a ‘fair’ fine
designed to deter the infringe-
ment in first place could be
enough to push the company out
of business, causing additional
harm to consumers9. On the other
hand, cartels might be especially
harmful during crises, by draining
value from customers (be they
companies or consumers) which
are also struggling in the face of
adverse economic conditions. It is
therefore risky to send a gener-
alised signal of greater tolerance
of collusion during crises. There
is, however, an issue of the credi-
bility of the sanction: a firm going
bankrupt would obviously not pay
any fine. A fining policy which is
independent of contingent eco-
nomic conditions may therefore
risk being an insufficient deter-
rent (Fabra and Motta, 2012). The
2006 fining guidelines explicitly
recognise this by granting a
degree of discretion in the calcu-
lation whenever the fine would
“irretrievably jeopardise the eco-
nomic viability of the
undertaking” (in addition to other
conditions – see the guidelines,
point 35).
Figure 4 on the next page plots
selected indicators of anti-cartel
measures taken by the European
Commission against the EU real
GDP growth rate. It is easy to spot
the crisis-related sharp fall in the
growth rate. Figure (a) shows the
trend in average per company
fines: though with a slight time
lag, fines per company appear
strongly correlated to the eco-
nomic cycle. Figure (b) shows the
increase in requests for reduc-
tions in fines for  ‘inability to pay’
because of the economic crisis;
most interestingly, this indicates
that the Commission started to
accept these requests only in
2008. In 2010, in the aftermath of
the crisis, 45 percent of sanc-
tioned undertakings asked for
indulgence in view of their inabil-
ity to pay; slightly fewer than a
third of the applications were ulti-
mately successful. The red line in
panel (c) shows the trend in the
calculation of ‘aggravating factor’
as a proportion of the basic
amount defined in step 1 of the
process. Aggravating factors are
added to the fine whenever there
is reason to believe that the com-
pany behaved in a particularly
harmful way. The (unweighted)
average aggravating factor fluctu-
ated between 40 percent and 60
percent up to 2008, and then
dropped sharply to 15-20 per-
cent. While there is no reason to
each year in which cartels were
active, indexed to inflation. Since
the sample is made up of cartels
discovered between 2001 and
2012, most of the value drained
corresponds to the previous
decade: 1990-2000, when most
of the recently discovered cartels
were active (it takes on average
13 years after its commencement
for a cartel to be sanctioned).
According to our estimates, the
total value drained by the cartels
for which EEA sales information is
available is between €18.7 billion
and €33.1 billion, depending on
the price increase induced by the
cartel. If extrapolated to the rest of
our sample to include decisions
for which information on affected
EEA sales is not reported, the total
value drained would be between
€27.1 billion and €48 billion8. Fur-
thermore, it is important to note
that most cartels are never dis-
covered by antitrust authorities. If
one were to accept 15 percent as
the detection rate, and assume
that uncovered cartels are not too
dissimilar to undiscovered car-
tels, the total value drained by
explicit collusion could be in the
range of €181 billion and €320
billion, or more than three percent
of 2012 euro-area GDP.
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Source: Bruegel. Note: only cartels for which EEA market information is provided.
Figure 3: Annual value drained by cartels, 2001-12, € millions (left axis)
believe that cartelists became
less ‘nasty’ after 2008, indul-
gence in relation to aggravating
factors might have been a way for
the Commission to ‘soften’ its
fines during the crisis. This is fur-
ther confirmed by panel (d) of
Figure 4, which shows a continual
decrease in the yearly trend in the
average unweighted ‘starting’ and
‘additional deterrence’ values as a
proportion of EEA sales.
ARE FINES TOO HIGH?
In order to test if the fines
imposed by the Commission
acted as a deterrent, we focus on
the subsample of decisions in
which some information on EEA
sales by the single company was
disclosed (Box 1).
For each company, we estimate
the total additional profits
realised because of the cartel,
and compare them with the size
of the fine ultimately applied.
Both profits and fines are com-
pared in net present value at the
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10. Figures 5 and 6
respectively assume:
15 and 30 percent price
overcharge and -2 and 
-1 elasticity. Both fig-
ures assume a profit
margin of 15 percent
and a five percent dis-
count rate. The
resulting extra profits
earned by the cartel are
thus respectively 7.4
percent and 18.1 per-
cent of EEA sales. See
Box 1 for details.
11. This of course is
without accounting for
secondary costs such
as reputational
damages.
12. If Figure 5 is re-plot-
ted using fine basic
amounts, ie without
considering mitigating
factors, all extra profits
are offset. Motta and
Polo (2003) warn that
the introduction of
leniency programmes,
while making collusion
less stable, may reduce
expected collusion
costs and therefore
may have ambiguous
effects on deterrence.
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point at which the cartel started.
Figures 5 and 6 on the next page
show the outcomes. The two fig-
ures are based on different
assumptions: Figure 5 minimises
the potential additional profits,
while additional profits are
slightly higher in Figure 610. The
columns in the figures are the dif-
ference in percentage terms
between the fine and the esti-
mated additional profits yielded
by the cartel. For the fine to offset
the additional profits, the
columns have to be above zero.
Surprisingly enough, even in the
most conservative scenario
reported in Figure 6, in 27 cases
out of 63 (ie 43 percent of the
sample) the fine is lower than the
estimated extra profits. When
slightly higher profits are esti-
mated (Figure 6), fines are below
the additional profits in 81 per-
cent of cases.
This result relies on specific
assumptions, and the subsample
of companies for which informa-
tion on EEA sales is available
might not be representative of the
whole population of cartels. Nev-
ertheless, the result is striking.
Fines are very far from their opti-
mal level, which would be 6.7
times the additional profits. For a
significant number of cartels,
fines are below what would be
needed to ensure deterrence,
even assuming a 100 percent
detection rate. If at the time when
they were considering whether or
not to enter the cartel those com-
panies could perfectly foresee
future profits and costs, they
would still have found it profitable
to commit the infringement, even
knowing that they would ulti-
mately be caught11.
Interestingly, fines do not fully
match actual profits because of
the reductions that are granted to
companies for mitigating factors
or because of other forms of con-
tingent indulgence (such as
leniency reduction, the 10 per-
cent cap or inability to pay)12. 
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Figure 4: The effect of the crisis on cartel fines
INCREASING DETERRENCE
This analysis  indicates that cur-
rent deterrents against cartels are
insufficient, and suggests that
fines should be increased. How-
ever, higher fines entail (more or
less hidden) costs for society and
might be difficult to implement.
Fines might discourage pro-com-
petitive activities: as long as the
probability of mistakenly convict-
ing an innocent company is
greater than zero, companies
might refrain from engaging in
welfare-enhancing activities, for
example forming a pro-competi-
tive research venture or joining a
trade association which would
have beneficial spillovers on pro-
duction (Harrington, 2012).
Moreover, an increase in fines is
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
07
DO EUROPEAN UNION FINES DETER PRICE FIXING?
likely to have a smaller marginal
impact than it might have had in
the past. The higher the fine, the
greater the probability that the
fine reaches the institutional ceil-
ings designed to ensure that a
fine does not destabilise the
financial viability of a company
(Bos and Schinkel, 2006). At the
margin, this translates, for exam-
ple, into greater profitability for
longer-duration infringements.
Finally, excessive fines conflict
with the legal principle of propor-
tionality (Wils, 2006), and are
therefore not deemed credible (in
other words, they might be
reduced after a judicial review).
This explains why economic
theory is increasingly focused on
personal sanctions rather than
sanctions for shareholders. Per-
sonal sanctions would ensure
deterrence by imposing costs on
decision makers within compa-
nies (see, for example, Baker,
2000). There is an increasing will-
ingness around the world to adopt
administrative and criminal sanc-
tions against individuals. Such a
discussion at European Union
level is tricky, for obvious rea-
sons: the Commission does not
have the power to bypass
national jurisdictions and impose
criminal sanctions on cartel mem-
bers. And while harmonisation of
member states’ criminal laws
might ultimately indirectly
enhance the effectiveness of
Commission sanctions, the
prospects for this are uncertain.
Still, something more concrete
could be done in the short term to
increase pressure on individuals.
The average duration of a cartel
fluctuates between six and 14
years. But it might take four to six
years after the start of a cartel
investigation before the infringe-
ment decision is taken.
Thus, on average, an executive
deciding to involve her company
in a cartel should not expect to be
officially sanctioned until 10 to
20 years after the start of the ille-
gal action. Over such a time span,
managers will change job or even
retire, essentially reaping the
benefit from the infringement
without fearing any cost. Even if
shareholders were willing to
attempt to recoup part of the fine
from the individuals directly
responsible for committing the
infringement (for example by dis-
qualify them and prevent them
from occupying executive roles
within the company), it would
150%
100%
50%
0%
-50%
-100%
-150%
Fine minus extra profits (18.1% additional profit)
63 companies (13% of full sample)
Source for both figures: Bruegel.
Figure 6: Fines and cartels' extra profits, higher profit scenario
63 companies (13% of full sample)
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Figure 5: Fines and cartels' extra profits, minimum profit scenario
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most likely occur too late to be a
real threat to an individual.
To increase pressure on individu-
als, it seems reasonable to try to
reduce the time between the start
of an infringement procedure and
the imposition of a fine. Speeding
up the procedure, for instance by
increasing the resources dedi-
cated to cartel inquiries, could
increase the net present value of
fines: the shorter the period sepa-
rating infringement and fine, the
less the fine is discounted.
Obviously, time is needed to con-
duct inquiries. Still, it is useful to
know to what extent deterrence is
undermined because of the dura-
tion of investigations. We
calculate that, with a five percent
discount rate, perceived fines in
that the duration of investigations
is reduced. Shorter investigations
would increase the financial and
corporate pressure on decision-
makers at the point at which the
illegal activity is started. These
results should be put in the con-
text of the discussion around the
Commission’s budgetary cuts.
While our analysis advocates for
an increase in resources dedi-
cated to investigations, it
conversely suggests that taking
away the resources currently
implemented could have critical
consequences in terms of
reduced deterrence and, there-
fore, increase collusion in the
European economy.
Excellent research assistance by
Marco Antonielli and Alice Gambarin
is gratefully acknowledged.
13. This is calculated by
comparing total fines in
net present value with
and without
investigation time.
14. The weighted
average fine per
undertaking during the
whole period of
observation in net
present value at the time
of the starting of the
cartel is €20.3 million.
The net present value
would increase to €22.5
million and to €24.9
million if the
investigation length
were halved or set to
zero, respectively.
net present value are 18 percent
lower because of the time taken
to conclude an investigation13. A
reduction in the expected dura-
tion by, say, half would increase
the average net present value of
fines in our sample by more than
10 percent14.
We conclude that, even if fines are
very small compared to what is
needed to ensure deterrence, fur-
ther increases in fines are not
necessarily the best way to go.
Targeting the corporate execu-
tives who are responsible for
cartels could be a medium- to
long-term objective which could
complement corporate fines and
ensure a higher level of deter-
rence. In the short term, an option
for the Commission would be to
invest additional resources so
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